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Abstract. Following Ramsey, the existing literature on optimal quantity taxation only compares the pre and the post-tax 
market equilibriums in order to account for the efficiency losses. However, when the government imposes a quantity tax 
on the consumer, the buyer’s price jumps to the pre-tax equilibrium price plus the amount of the tax, and the supply and 
the demand of the taxed commodity then adjust over time to bring the new post-tax market equilibrium. The existing 
literature does not take into account the efficiency losses during the adjustment process while computing the optimal 
quantity taxes. This paper derives an optimal quantity tax path in a dynamic setting minimizing the efficiency losses (output 
and/ or consumption lost) during the dynamic adjustment process as well as the post-tax market equilibrium. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Optimal taxation in theory is the design of a tax that minimizes inefficiency and distortion due to 
deviation from the pre-tax efficient market equilibrium under given economic constraints. Ramsey 
(1927) was the first to make a significant contribution to the theory of optimal taxation from an 
economic standpoint. He developed a theory for optimal commodity taxes and proposed a 
theoretical solution that consumption tax on each good should be "proportional to the sum of the 
reciprocals of its supply and demand elasticities". Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) consider 
commodity taxation along with the other kinds of taxes. Mirrless (1975) modified the standard 
problem by considering simultaneously excise taxes and a poll tax. Diamond (1975) examines 
the Ramsey rule for a many-person economy with excise taxes and a poll tax. Atkinson and Stiglitz 
(1976) show that with an optimal nonlinear income tax, discriminatory commodity taxes are only 
necessary to the extent that individual commodities are not weakly separable from leisure. In 
Deaton (1981), rules for optimal differential commodity taxes have been derived for the three 
different cases usually studied in the literature: the one consumer economy, the unidimensional 
continuum of consumers economy, and the finite number of discrete consumers economy. Lucas 
and Stokey (1983) derive a time consistent optimal fiscal policy in an economy without capital 
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maximizing the consumer welfare subject to the condition that a competitive equilibrium holds in 
each time period. 
In Judd (1985), the government taxes capital income net of depreciation at a proportional rate, 
which is assumed to be constant. Chamley (1986) analyzes the optimal tax on capital income in 
general equilibrium models of the second best. Deaton and Stern (1986) show that optimal 
commodity taxes for an economy with many households should be at a uniform proportional rate 
under certain conditions. Cremer and Gahvari (1993) incorporate tax evasion into Ramsey’s 
optimal taxation problem. Cremer and Gahvari (1995) prove that optimal taxation requires a mix 
of differential commodity taxes and a uniform lump-sum tax. Naito (1999) shows that imposing a 
non-uniform commodity tax can Pareto-improve welfare even under nonlinear income taxation if 
the production side of an economy is taken into the consideration. Saez (2002) shows that a small 
tax on a given commodity is desirable if high-income earners have a relatively higher taste for this 
commodity or if consumption of this commodity increases with leisure. 
The quantity taxes are currently more popular in the environmental economics literature, e.g. 
Nordhaus (1993) proposes an optimal carbon tax (tax per ton of carbon). Chari, Christiano and 
Kehoe (1994) deal with the labor and capital income taxes instead of a quantity tax as in our 
model. Ekins (1996) takes into account the secondary benefits of Carbon dioxide abatement for 
an optimal carbon tax. Coleman (2000) derives the optimal dynamic taxation of consumption, 
income from labor, and income from capital, and estimates the welfare gain that the US could 
attain by switching from its current income tax policy to an optimal dynamic tax policy. Pizer (2002) 
explores the possibility of a hybrid permit system and a dynamic optimal policy path in order to 
accommodate growth and not because of the adjustment over time to equalize the marginal 
benefit and cost. It is implicitly assumed that the marginal cost equals the marginal benefit in each 
time-period. 
Following Ramsey, the existing literature on optimal quantity taxation only compares the pre 
and the post-tax market equilibriums in order to account for the efficiency losses. However, when 
the government imposes a quantity tax on the consumer, the buyer’s price jumps to the pre-tax 
equilibrium price plus the amount of the tax, and the supply and the demand of the taxed 
commodity then adjust over time to bring the new post-tax market equilibrium. The existing 
literature does not take into account the efficiency losses during the adjustment process while 
computing the optimal quantity taxes. This paper derives an optimal quantity tax path in a dynamic 
setting minimizing the efficiency losses (output and/ or consumption lost) during the dynamic 
adjustment process as well as the post-tax market equilibrium. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 explains how the individual 
components of the market system are joined together to form a dynamic market model. Section 
3 provides the solution of the model with a quantity tax imposed. Section 4 derives an optimal 
commodity tax path minimizing the efficiency losses subject to a tax revenue target in a specific 
time-period. Section 5 summarizes the findings and concludes. The appendix presents 
mathematical details. 
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2. The model 
 
Let’s assume that there is a perfectly competitive market of a single homogeneous commodity in 
equilibrium (so our starting point is when the market is already in equilibrium). There are four 
types of infinitely-lived agents: a representative -or a unit mass of- producer (that produces a 
good, and demand labor and capital), a middleman (who buys the good from firms to sell to 
consumers, and possibly accumulating inventories), a representative –or a unit mass of– 
consumer (who buys the good, accumulates capital by investing and supplies labor inelastically), 
and a government. The role of middleman is motivated by the real world scenario where the 
producer and the consumer seldom directly meet for a transaction to take place. The existence 
of retailers, wholesalers, financial institutions, educational institutions and the hospitals reflect the 
presence of middlemen between producers and consumers in most of the economic activity going 
on. The producer produces the goods and supplies those to the middleman, who keeps an 
inventory of the goods and sells those to the consumer at the market price. In the model, the 
middleman plays a key role, as she sets the selling price 𝑝𝑝  by maximizing the difference between 
the revenue for selling goods to consumers and the costs of inventories. The buying price paid to 
the producer is 𝛼𝛼 𝑝𝑝  with 𝛼𝛼 < 1, and the producer is a price taker. 
The price adjustment mechanism is based on the fact that when a shock leads the market out 
of equilibrium, the buyers’ and sellers’ decisions are not coordinated at the current prices. An 
example can illustrate the working of this market. Consider that the market is initially in equilibrium. 
The middleman has an equilibrium stock of inventory. Then, an exogenous demand contraction 
will increase the stock of inventory, due to firms’ output could not match with the –now lower– 
units demanded by the consumer at the current price. This excess of supply is accumulated in 
inventory held by the middleman. The middleman will decrease the price so that the producer will 
find optimal to produce a lower level of output. A new equilibrium with a lower price and a lower 
level of output is then reached. The equilibrium is defined as follows: 
(i) The producer and the middleman maximize their profits and the consumer maximizes her 
utility subject to the constraints they face (mentioned in their individual dynamic optimization 
problems in Section 2). 
(ii) The quantity supplied by the producer equals the quantity consumed by the consumer (and 
hence the inventory does not change when the market is in equilibrium). 
The conditions for the existence of the equilibrium (Routh–Hurwitz stability criterion, which 
provides a necessary and sufficient condition for the stability of a linear dynamical system) have 
been mentioned in Section 3. 
As the set-up is for a perfectly competitive market, therefore, the middleman who sells the 
goods to the consumer at the market price is a price taker when the market is in equilibrium. When 
the market is out of equilibrium, the middleman can change the price along the dynamic 
adjustment path until the new equilibrium arrives, where again the middleman becomes a price 
taker. The government announces and imposes a commodity tax at the same time (the 
expectations of the agents will be taken into account in a future research project when the dates 
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of announcement and implementation of the tax are different). When a commodity/ quantity tax is 
imposed, the market does not suddenly jump to the post-tax market equilibrium, rather the price 
adjusts over time to bring the new equilibrium. This adjustment process involves endogenous 
decision making (in their own interest) by all the agents in the market, i.e. consumer, producer 
and the middleman as follows: Suppose there is a producer in a market who produces a 
perishable good and sells it to a middleman who further sells it to a consumer living in a 
community. The producer and the middleman sell a quantity exactly equal to the quantity the 
producer produces in each time period, and the market stays in equilibrium. If the government 
announces and imposes a commodity tax on the buyer, which decreases the demand of this 
product, some of the production sold to the middleman will remain unsold to the consumer and 
be wasted by the end of the time period in which the tax was imposed. Assuming that the producer 
and the middleman can change the production and the price respectively, immediately, had they 
known the exact pattern of new demand, they would immediately pick the quantity (by the 
producer) and the price (by the middleman) to maximize their profits and clear the market without 
wasting the production. However, they lack this information, so the middleman decreases the 
price based on her best guess about the new demand (based on the quantity of the unsold 
production), driving the market close to the new equilibrium. At the lower price, the producer 
produces a lower quantity than before. If in the following time period, his production sold to the 
middleman is fully sold out to the consumer, he will know that the new equilibrium has arrived, 
however, if a part of his production still remains unsold, the middleman will reduce the price further 
(and the producer, the production accordingly) to bring the market closer to the new equilibrium. 
The market will eventually settle at the new equilibrium after some efficiency loss. The resources 
wasted by the imposition of the tax are those that went into the unsold production in each time-
period during the adjustment process. A new equilibrium with a deadweight loss due to commodity 
taxation is finally arrived at. The total efficiency loss because of commodity taxation is the loss 
during the adjustment process plus the loss in the final equilibrium. 
For the mathematical treatment, the objective of each of the three market agents is maximized 
through the first order conditions of their objective functions and to capture the collective result of 
their individual actions, the equations representing their individual actions are solved 
simultaneously. For simplification, we assume that after the imposition of the quantity tax, the new 
equilibrium is not too far from the initial equilibrium. This assumption makes the linearization of 
supply and demand curves quite reasonable; see Figure 1 (the time axis is not shown). 
Linearization seems to be a good approximation when we move from point a to b, whereas it is 
not a good approximation when we move from point a to c. For modeling the movement of the 
market from point a to c, we need to model a non-linear dynamical system (which is not covered 
under the scope of this paper). 
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Figure 1: When is Linearity a Reasonable Assumption? 
 
 
2.1 Middleman 
 
The middleman purchases goods from the producer and sells those to the consumer for profit. As 
happens in the real world, the middleman does not buy and sell exactly the same quantity at all 
points in time, thus he holds an inventory of the goods purchased to be sold subsequently. 
Inventory is an intermediary stage between supply and demand which reflects the quantum of 
difference between supply and demand of the goods in the market. If the inventory remains the 
same, it implies that demand and supply rates are the same. An increase or decrease in inventory 
implies a change in supply, demand or both at different rates. 
Figure 2 helps to understand the link between inventory, supply, demand and prices. When 
the supply curve shifts to the right (while demand remains the same), the inventory in the market 
increases at the initial price, and the new equilibrium brings the price down. Similarly, when the 
demand curve shifts to the right (while supply remains constant), the inventory depletes from the 
market at the previous price and the new equilibrium brings the price up. This shows that there is 
an inverse relationship between an inventory change and a price change (all else the same). If 
both the supply and demand curves shift by the same magnitude such that the inventory does not 
change, then price will also remain the same. Inventory unifies the supply and demand shocks in 
the sense that they are both affecting the same factor, i.e. inventory and are basically the faces 
of the same coin. Therefore each kind of shock is in fact just an inventory shock. From the above 
mentioned discussion, we have seen that there is an inverse relationship between an inventory 
change and a price change. 
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Figure 2: Movement of Price with Inventory. 
 
 
Now let’s discuss the mechanism which brings about such a change. Consider a market of 
homogeneous goods where the middlemen, such as whole sellers, retailers, etc. hold inventories, 
incur some cost for holding those, and sell products to the consumers to make profits. The cost 
is a positive function of the size of an inventory, i.e. a larger inventory costs more to hold as 
compared to a smaller inventory. In the absence of an exogenous shock, if the supply and demand 
rates are equal then the system is in equilibrium and the price does not vary with time. Suppose 
that a technological advancement decreases the marginal cost of production and increases the 
supply rate, whereas the demand rate remains the same. As the demand and supply rates are 
no longer equal, therefore the difference will appear somewhere in the economy in the form of 
piled up inventories. As the production flows from the producer to the consumer through the 
middleman, therefore it is reasonable to assume that the middleman will be holding the net 
difference (Explanation: The piled up inventories can also be in the form of producers’ inventories 
of finished goods, which does not change the key point that a difference of supply and demand 
rates directly affect the inventories in the economy). The economy will not be able to sustain this 
situation indefinitely, and the middlemen will have to think of some means of getting rid of piled 
up inventories. The only resort they have is to decrease the price which brings the demand up 
along the demand curve. 
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In a perfectly competitive market, the price will eventually come down to equalize the new 
marginal cost, however the adjustment path depends on how the middlemen react to the change 
in their inventories. Notice that the marginal cost of production has decreased but the marginal 
cost of holding an extra unit of inventory for the middleman has increased. This is an intuitive 
explanation which is theoretically consistent with the demand, supply, utility and profit 
maximization by a consumer and a producer respectively. In the real world, we see examples of 
this behavior of middlemen, e.g. as consumers, we enjoy the end of year sales, offers such as 
buy one get one free, gift offers if you buy above a certain quantity threshold, etc. For a 
mathematical treatment, we need to consider the profit maximization problem of the middleman 
as follows. 
 
2.1.1 Short-run problem 
 
Let’s first consider the short-run problem of the middleman as follows (the middleman’s objective 
is myopic rather than doing dynamic optimization. In a discrete analog, this is a one period 
analysis, which is presented for an intuitive purpose as an anticipation of the -more complicated- 
dynamic problem in section 2.1.2). 
 )),,(()(= epmppq ς−Π  [1] 
 
where 
=Π  profit, 
p  =  market price, 
)( pq  =  quantity sold at price ,p  
=m  inventory (total number of goods held by the middleman), 
e  =  other factors which influence inventory other than the market price including the 
middleman’s purchase price from the producer, 
)),(( epmς  =  cost as a function of inventory (increasing in inventory). 
 
The first order condition (with respect to price) is as follows: 
 0,=),()),(()()( 1
...
epmepmpqpqp ς−+  [2] 
 
The middleman has an incentive to change the price only during the adjustment process and will 
incur losses by deviating from the price (equal to the marginal cost) when the market is in 
equilibrium. During the adjustment process, the demand does not equal the supply and the market 
drifts toward the new equilibrium (however, the price cannot move automatically and it is 
reasonable to assume that some economic agent moves the price in her own benefit), therefore 
a price change by the middleman in the direction of bringing the new equilibrium is not against 
the market forces, so he does not lose business by changing price on the adjustment path unlike 
when the market is in equilibrium and where the middleman faces an infinitely elastic demand as 
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follows:  
 ),,()),((=)()( 1
...
epmepmpqpqp ς+  
 ,
)(
),()),((=11 .
1
.
.
pq
epmepm
ticitydemandelas
p ς





+  
 .
)(
)(=
.
pq
pqpticitydemandelas  
 
The right hand side of the above expression is the marginal cost which equals the price when 
the middleman faces an infinitely elastic demand. Suppose that as a result of a supply shock, the 
marginal cost of production decreases, and the supply curve shifts downwards. Now the 
competitive market is out of equilibrium as the demand does not equal the supply at the previous 
equilibrium price. The price must eventually decrease to bring the new equilibrium, however, the 
price will not jump to equalize the demand and supply, and rather the middleman will continue 
charging a price higher than the new marginal cost until the market forces make him realize that 
the supply has increased and he needs to lower the price to satisfy the profit maximizing condition. 
The similar is the case of a reverse supply shock, where the price must eventually increase to 
bring the new equilibrium. In this case, the middleman will continue charging a price lower than 
the marginal cost until the market forces make him increase the price, in which case it is the 
consumer who is the short term beneficiary. Again, the consumer will be paying a price less than 
the marginal cost only during the adjustment process and only until the middleman increases the 
price. The equilibrium price is equal to the marginal cost of production plus the marginal cost of 
storage (i.e. the total marginal cost) in the absence of any kind of a tax, so neither does the 
middleman earn any economic rent, nor does the consumer benefit by paying a price less than 
the marginal cost when the competitive market is in equilibrium. 
For the mathematical treatment, suppose that as a result of a supply shock (while demand 
remains the same) such as a technological advancement which reduces the marginal cost of 
production and increases the supply by the producers, if the middleman wants to hold an extra 
unit of inventory, his marginal cost of holding an extra unit, i.e. 
)(
),()),(( .
1
.
.
pq
epmepmς , is higher at 
the previous price, because the term )),((
.
epmς  is higher at the previous price. This might be 
on account of higher storage charges because of increased demand of warehouses, godowns, 
etc. after increased supply in the market. The second term, i.e. 
)(
),(
.
1
.
pq
epm
 is a function of price, 
and is the same as before as the price has not changed yet (we are assuming that the 
middleman’s purchase price is the same as before as the producer is a price taker during the 
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adjustment process as well and always charges a fixed fraction of the market price to the 
middleman). A discrete analog of this scenario is that the middleman maximizes profits in each 
time period without considering the future time periods, and in each time period he takes the 
purchase price from the producer as given and only chooses the sale price. This implies that on 
the previous price, now the middleman faces  
 
 0,<),()),(()()(= 1
...
epmepmpqpqp
p
ς−+
∂
Π∂
 [3] 
 
which means that the middleman must decrease the price to hold an extra unit of inventory to 
satisfy the profit maximizing condition after the supply shock. Please notice that in this static 
scenario, the short term gains accrued from the decreased marginal cost of production will be 
reaped by the producer, as his marginal cost has decreased but he charges the same price to the 
middleman until the middleman changes the price. If we plot together various profit maximizing 
combinations of inventories and the respective prices chosen by a middleman, we will get a 
downward sloping inventory curve with the price on the y -axis and the inventory on the x -axis. 
This is analogous to the concept of supply and demand curves for the profit maximizing producers 
and the utility maximizing consumers respectively. 
 
2.1.2 Dynamic problem 
 
Now let’s consider the dynamic problem of the middleman. In a dynamic setting, the middleman 
maximizes the present discounted value of the future stream of profits, and his present value at 
time zero is as follows:  
 [ ] ,)),(()(=(0)
0
dteepmppqV rt−
∞
−∫ ς  [4] 
 
where r  denotes the discount rate, )(tp  is the control variable and )(tm  the state variable. The 
maximization problem can be written as  
{ }
[ ] ,)),(()(=(0)
0
)(
dteepmppqVMax rt
tp
−
∞
−∫ ς  
subject to the constraints 
)()),(())),((),(()())),((),((=)(
.
1
..
2
..
1
.
tpztpeztpetpmtpztpetpmtm +  (state equation, 
describing how the state variable changes with time; z  are exogenous factors), 
smm =(0)  (initial condition), 
0)( ≥tm  (non-negativity constraint on state variable), 
)(∞m  free (terminal condition). 
200 
N. Nawaz / European Journal of Government and Economics 6(2), 191-225 
 
 
The current-value Hamiltonian for this case is  
 .
)),((
))),((),(())),((),(()()()))),((),((())(()(=~
1
.
.
2
.
1
.







 ∗++−
ztpe
ztpetpmztpetpmtptztpetpmtpqtpH µς  [5] 
 
The maximizing conditions are as follows: 
)(i  )(tp∗  maximizes H~  for all t : 0,=
~
p
H
∂
∂
 
)(ii  ,
~
=
.
m
Hr
∂
∂
−− µµ  
)(iii  
µ∂
∂∗ Hm
~
=
.
 (this just gives back the state equation), 
)(iv  0=)()(lim rt
t
etmt −
∞→
µ  (the transversality condition). 
 
The first two conditions are as follows:  
 0,=
~
p
H
∂
∂
 [6] 
 
and  
 ))).),((),(((=
~
=
..
ztpetpm
m
Hr ςµµ
∂
∂
−−  [7] 
 
When the market is in equilibrium, 0,=)(
.
tp  and the expression 
p
H
∂
∂
~
 boils down to the 
following (see appendix):  
 
,
))((
)),(())),((),((
))((
))),((),(()))),((),(((=11)( .
1
..
2
.
1
.
.








+





+
tpq
ztpeztpetpm
tpq
ztpetpmztpetpm
ticitydemandelas
tp ς  
 
whiche suggests that the price equals the marginal cost (the right hand side of the above 
expression is the marginal cost in a dynamic setting, which is different from that in a static problem 
on account of the fact that in a dynamic setting the middleman also takes into account the impact 
of price chosen on his purchase price from the producer) when the demand is infinitely elastic. 
Now suppose that as a result of a supply shock, if the middleman wants to hold an extra unit of 
inventory, then the marginal cost of holding an extra unit is higher because the term 
)))),((),(((
.
ztpetpmς  is higher at the previous price at that point in time. The term in 
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parentheses in the expression of the marginal cost, i.e. 
))((
)),(())),((),((
))((
))),((),((
.
1
..
2
.
1
.
tpq
ztpeztpetpm
tpq
ztpetpm
+  is a function of price and is the same at 
the previous price. This implies that on the previous price, now the middleman faces  
 0.<
~
p
H
∂
∂
 
Therefore, in order to satisfy the condition of dynamic optimization, the middleman must 
decrease the price for an increase in inventory. This implies a negative relationship between price 
and inventory. The concept of inventory unifies the market supply and demand. If the supply and 
demand rates are equal, the market is in a steady state equilibrium. If a difference of finite 
magnitude is created between the supply and demand rates and the consumer and the producer 
do not react to a price change induced by a difference in the supply and demand rates, the price 
will continue changing until the system saturates. This behavior can be depicted by the following 
formulation:  
 
 inventory.market in  changechange Price ∝  
 change. price=P  
 market, in theinventory in  change== smmM −  
 at timeinventory =m t, 
 state.steady in inventory =sm  
 ,=)(==outputInput
dt
dM
dt
mmd
dt
dm s−−  
 ( ) .outputinput=or dtM −∫  
 ( ) or,rate demandratesupply change Price dt−∝ ∫  
 ( ) ,rate demandratesupply = dtKP m −− ∫  
 
where mK  is the proportionality constant; supply and demand rate is the supply and demand per 
unit time respectively. A negative sign indicates that when ( )rate demandratesupply −  is 
positive, then P  is negative (i.e. price decreases). The above equation can be re-arranged as 
follows:  
 ( ) or,=rate demandratesupply 
mK
Pdt −−∫  
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 ( ) ,=0
m
i K
Pdtww −−∫  [8] 
 
 
,ratesupply =iw  
,rate demand=0w  
=mK dimensional constant. 
 
Let at time 0=t , supply rate = demand rate (market is in a steady state equilibrium), then eq. 
[8] can be written as  
 ( ) 0.=0 dtww sis −∫  [9] 
 
The subscript s  indicates the steady state equilibrium and 0=P  in steady state. Subtracting 
eq. [9] from eq. [8], we obtain 
 ( ) ( ) or,=00
m
sisi K
Pdtwwdtww −−−− ∫∫  
  
 ( ) ,=0
m
i K
PdtWW −−∫  [10] 
 
rate,supply in  change== where iisi Www − rate. demandin  change== 000 Www s−  
,P  iW  and 0W  are deviation variables, which indicate deviation from the steady state equilibrium. 
The initial values of the deviation variables are zero. Eq. (10)  may also be written as follows:  
 
 ,== MKWdtKP mm −− ∫  [11] 
 
where .= 0WWW i −  If P  gets a jump as a result of some factor other than an inventory change, 
such as imposition of a tax on consumer, that is considered as a separate input and can be added 
to eq. (11)  as follows:  
 
 .== JMKJWdtKP mm +−+− ∫  [11a] 
 
Similarly, there can be an exogenous shock in inventory other than the price feedback. 
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2.2 Producer 
 
The producer maximizes the present discounted value of the future stream of profits, and his 
present value at time zero is as follows:  
 ( ) ( )( ) ( )[ ] ,)()()(,)(=(0)
0
dtetIttLtwtLtKFtpV rt−
∞
ℜ−−∫ α  [12] 
 
α  is the fraction of the market price the producer charges to the middleman. r denotes the 
discount rate. )(tL  (labor) and )(tI  (level of investment) are the control variables and )(tK  the 
state variable. The maximization problem can be written as  
 
{ }
( ) ( )( ) ( )[ ] ,)()()(,)(=(0)
0
)(),(
dtetIttLtwtLtKFtpVMax rt
tItL
−
∞
ℜ−−∫ α  
 
subject to 
)()(=)(
.
tKtItK δ−  (state equation, describing how the state variable changes with time), 
0=(0) KK  (initial condition), 
0)( ≥tK  (non-negativity constraint on state variable), 
)(∞K  free (terminal condition). 
 
The current-value Hamiltonian for this case is  
 
 ( ) ( )( ) ( ) [ ].)()()()()()(,)(=~ tKtIttIttLtwtLtKFtpH δµα −+ℜ−−  [13] 
 
Now the maximizing conditions are as follows: 
)(i  )(tL∗  and )(tI ∗  maximize H~  for all t : 0=
~
L
H
∂
∂
 and 0,=
~
I
H
∂
∂
 
)(ii  ,
~
=
.
K
Hr
∂
∂
−− µµ  
)(iii  
µ∂
∂∗ HK
~
=
.
 (this just gives back the state equation), 
)(iv  0=)()(lim rt
t
etKt −
∞→
µ  (the transversality condition). 
 
The first two conditions are as follows:  
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0,=
~
L
H
∂
∂
 [14] 
 
0,=
~
I
H
∂
∂
 [15] 
 
and  
.
~
=
.
K
Hr
∂
∂
−− µµ  [16] 
 
In order to satisfy the condition of dynamic optimization after the price increase, the producer 
must increase the production level (see appendix). Let p  = market price, c  = a reference price 
(such as the retail price which includes the production cost, profit of producer and profit of the 
middleman). c  is a parameter which may vary with time or be kept fixed for a limited time period, 
e.g. the cost of a product may vary over time or can also remain constant for a while. It is the 
reference point with respect to which the variation in p  is considered by the producer for decision 
making.  
 price,in  change  todue productionin  Change=mW  
 
)( cp − acts as an incentive for the producer to produce more. Therefore, 
 
 or),( cpWm −∝α  
  
 ).(= cpKW sm −  [17] 
 
When the market is in equilibrium, then 0,=mW  or  
 
 ).(=0 sss cpK −  [18] 
 
sK  is the proportionality constant. sp  and sc  are the steady state equilibrium values. Subtracting 
eq. [18] from eq. [17], 
 
 ( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ,=== εsssssm KPCKccppKW −−−−−−  [19] 
 
where mW , C and P  are deviation variables. 
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2.3 Consumer 
 
The consumer maximizes the present discounted value of the future stream of utilities, and his 
present value at time zero is as follows:  
 ,))((=(0)
0
dtetxUV tρ−
∞
∫  [20] 
 
where ρ  denotes the discount rate and )(tx  is the control variable. The maximization problem 
can be written as  
 
{ }
,))((=(0)
0
)(
dtetxUVMax t
tx
ρ−
∞
∫  
subject to 
)()()()()(=)(
.
txtptwtatRta −+  (state equation, describing how the state variable changes 
with time). )(ta  is asset holdings (a state variable) and )(tw  and )(tR  are exogenous time 
path of wages and return on assets. 
saa =(0)  (initial condition), 
0)( ≥ta  (non-negativity constraint on state variable), 
)(∞a  free (terminal condition). 
 
The current-value Hamiltonian for this case is  
 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ].)())((=~ txtptwtatRttxUH −++ µ  [21] 
 
Now the maximizing conditions are as follows: 
)(i  )(tx∗  maximizes H~  for all t : 0,=
~
x
H
∂
∂
 
)(ii  ,
~
=
.
a
H
∂
∂
−− ρµµ  
)(iii  
µ∂
∂∗ Ha
~
=
.
 (this just gives back the state equation), 
)(iv  0=)()(lim t
t
etat ρµ −
∞→
 (the transversality condition). 
 
The first two conditions are as follows:  
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( ) 0,=)()()(=
~ .
tpttxU
x
H µ−
∂
∂
 [22] 
 
and  
 ).()(=
~
=
.
tRt
a
H µρµµ −
∂
∂
−−  [23] 
 
If the price of good x  increases, the consumer faces (at the previous level of consumption)  
 ( ) 0.<)()()(=
~ .
tpttxU
x
H µ−
∂
∂
 
 
Therefore in order to satisfy the condition of dynamic optimization after the price increase, the 
consumer must decrease the consumption of good x . Let the change in demand be proportional 
to the change in price, i.e. P . Then we can write:  
 
 or,demandin  Change P∝  
  .= PKW dd −  [24] 
 
dW  is the change in demand due to P ; when P  is positive dW  is negative. 
 
3. Solution of the model with a quantity tax 
 
The solution of the model can be written as 
 
 ).(=)()()( tCKKtPKKK
dt
tdP
smdsm ++  [25] 
 
If TtC =)( , i.e. the government imposes a per unit tax on producer at 0=t , then the above 
differential equation becomes as follows:  
 
 .=)()()( TKKtPKKK
dt
tdP
smdsm ++  [26] 
 
The Routh–Hurwitz stability criterion (which provides a necessary and sufficient condition for 
stability of a linear dynamical system) for the stability of the above differential equation is 
0>)( dsm KKK + , which holds as mK , sK  and dK  are all defined to be positive. This ensures 
that, away from a given initial equilibrium, every adjustment mechanism will lead to another 
equilibrium. Now let’s look at the dynamics of the price if the quantity tax is imposed on the buyer 
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instead. The market price is the buyer’s price as before, however, the producer will be taking into 
account the price before tax for his/ her production decisions. Therefore,  
 
 ).(=)( tPTt −ε  [27] 
 
This implies that  
 ,=)()()( TKKtPKKK
dt
tdP
smdsm ++  
which is the same as eq. [26]. The solution of the above differential equation with initial conditions 
of a buyer’s tax is as follows: The solution has the form  
 
 
[ ] .=)( )(21
tdKsKmKeCCtP +−+  [28] 
 
Substituting the values of 1C  and 2C  in eq. [28] we obtain 
 
 
[ ] .=)( )( tdKsKmK
ds
d
ds
s e
KK
TK
KK
TKtP +−
+
+
+
 [29] 
 
When 0,=t  TP =(0)  (the initial condition), and when ,= ∞t  
ds
s
KK
TKP
+
∞ =)(  (the final 
steady state equilibrium value). In the final equilibrium, the quantity demanded must equal the 
quantity supplied, which holds (see appendix). 
 
4. An optimal quantity tax path 
 
The efficiency loss as a result of a tax, generally mentioned in the economics literature is the dead 
weight loss as a result of comparisons of the pre and post tax market equilibriums. However, the 
dynamic picture shows that there is some efficiency loss on the dynamic adjustment path to the 
new equilibrium as well after the tax. After the imposition of the tax, the price jumps to a price 
equal to the previous equilibrium price plus the tax. The price then adjusts over time to bring the 
new equilibrium price which is higher than the previous equilibrium price and less than the price 
at the time the tax was imposed depending on the elasticity of demand and supply schedules. A 
pile up of inventory indicates a higher supply than demand, and a depletion of inventory occurs 
when demand is higher than the supply in a given time period. When the demand and supply are 
the same, there is no efficiency loss. If the demand and supply are different, the output and/ or 
consumption is being lost at that point in time. Therefore if we sum up the inventory change at all 
points in time, we get the total efficiency loss, which is as follows:  
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 .)(=
0
dttMEL ∫
∞
 [30] 
 
Eq. [30] can be written as  
 [ ] .)(1=
0
dtTKKTtP
K
EL dm
m
−−− ∫
∞
 [30a] 
 
In Figure 3, the inventory difference jumps to TKd , i.e. the decrease in demand because of 
tax at 0=t . The demand does not equal the supply any longer, and the market forces come into 
play. The inventory along with the price adjusts over time and arrives at the new equilibrium, i.e. 
).(∞M  The shaded area is the efficiency loss (the amount of output and/ or consumption lost) 
during the adjustment process. The area between the lines 0,=)(tM  and )(=)( ∞MtM  is the 
efficiency loss resulting from a difference in pre and post tax market equilibriums. The expression 
for the tax revenue is as follows:  
 [ ].)((0)= tPKwTTR did −  [31] 
 
If we want to minimize the efficiency loss subject to the constraint that tax revenue generated 
is greater than or equal to G  in a given time period, our problem is as follows:  
 .s.t.min GTREL
T
≥  
 
 
  
Figure 3. Dynamic efficiency loss because of a quantity tax 
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The choice variable is the tax rate, and the constraint is binding. The Lagrangian for the above 
problem is as follows:  
 [ ] [ ][ ])((0))(1=
0
tPKwTGdtTKKTtP
K diddmm
−−+−−− ∫
∞
λL  
 
[ ] dtTK
K
Te
KKK
TK
KKK
TK
d
m
tdKsKmK
dsm
d
dsm
s






++
+
−
+
− +−∞
∫
)(
0 )()(
=  
 
[ ] .(0) )(




















+
+
+
−−+ +− tdKsKmK
ds
d
ds
s
did eKK
TK
KK
TKKwTGλ  
 
Taking the first order condition with respect to T , we get:  
 
[ ]
[ ]
.
2
)()(
1(0)
=
)(
)(
0






+
+
+






+
−
+
−+−
+−
+−
∞
∫
tdKsKmK
ds
d
ds
s
d
tdKsKmK
dsm
d
dsm
s
m
did
e
KK
K
KK
KK
dte
KKK
K
KKK
K
K
Kw
T
λ
λ
 [32] 
 
Taking the first order condition with respect to λ , we get:  
 
[ ] 0.=(0) )( 











+
+
+
−− +− tdKsKmK
ds
d
ds
s
did eKK
TK
KK
TKKwTG  [33] 
 
Eq. [32] can also be written as  
 .
2
(0)=
Q
JwT id
λ
λ −
 [34] 
 
Substituting the value of λ  into eq. [34], we obtain  
 .
2
4(0)(0)
=)(
2
Q
QGww
tT idid
−−
 [35] 
 
A negative optimal tax is an optimal subsidy. The second order condition for minimization has 
been checked (see appendix). Suppose that the government wants to generate a revenue of 
$1000 by imposing tax on a certain good. The initial equilibrium quantity of that good is 100, and 
the value of each one of ,mK  sK  and dK  is equal to one. Substituting these values in eq. [35] 
yields  
 11.27,=
2
400010000100=(0) −−T  
 
where ,0.50.5= 2teQ −+  and at 0,=t  1=Q . The tax revenue generated is 
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[ ] 1000.=(0)= QTwTTR id −  Now when ,= ∞t  0.5=Q . This implies that  
 
 10.56.=
1
200010000100=)( −−∞T  
 
The tax revenue is again 1000 as desired. Therefore the optimal quantity taxation is that the 
government should impose a tax rate of $11.27 per unit quantity initially and then gradually 
decrease the tax rate over time up to a final tax rate of $10.56 per unit quantity of the same good. 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
When a government imposes a quantity/ commodity tax on the consumer, the price jumps to 
the pre tax equilibrium price plus the amount of the tax. The demand and supply adjust over time 
to bring the new post tax equilibrium. As a result of a tax, there are efficiency losses during the 
adjustment process as well as the new post tax equilibrium as compared to the pre-tax efficient 
equilibrium. It is important to take into consideration the efficiency losses during the adjustment 
process as well while deriving an optimal tax schedule. Eq. (35)  gives an optimal quantity tax 
path over time which generates the same desired revenue at any given point in time considering 
the adjustment of demand and supply over time. The expression is a function of the slopes of the 
demand, supply and the inventory curves, and the initial pre-tax equilibrium quantity. The 
expression is much more complex as compared to the optimal tax expression of Ramsey, where 
he takes into account the efficiency losses just in the final equilibrium. 
Regarding further research, a complete dynamic welfare analysis against various 
governmental policies, such as value added tax, income tax, toll tax, corporate tax, environmental 
tax, etc. can be carried out and the optimal governmental policy instruments can be derived 
following the methodology developed in this paper. 
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Appendix 
 
Dynamic problem of the Middleman 
 
In a dynamic setting, the middleman maximizes the present discounted value of the future stream 
of profits, and his present value at time zero is as follows:  
 
 [ ] ,)),(()(=(0)
0
dteepmppqV rt−
∞
−∫ ς  [36] 
 
where r  denotes the discount rate, )(tp  is the control variable and )(tm  the state variable. The 
maximization problem can be written as  
 
{ }
[ ] ,)),(()(=(0)
0
)(
dteepmppqVMax rt
tp
−
∞
−∫ ς  
subject to the constraints that 
)()),(())),((),(()())),((),((=)(
.
1
..
2
..
1
.
tpztpeztpetpmtpztpetpmtm +  (state equation, 
describing how the state variable changes with time; z  are exogenous factors), 
smm =(0)  (initial condition), 
0)( ≥tm  (non-negativity constraint on state variable), 
)(∞m  free (terminal condition). 
The current-value Hamiltonian for this case is  
 .
)),((
))),((),(())),((),(()()()))),((),((())(()(=~
1
.
.
2
.
1
.







 ∗++−
ztpe
ztpetpmztpetpmtptztpetpmtpqtpH µς  [37] 
the maximizing conditions are as follows: 
)(i  )(tp∗  maximizes H~  for all t : 0,=
~
p
H
∂
∂
 
)(ii  ,
~
=
.
m
Hr
∂
∂
−− µµ  
)(iii  
µ∂
∂∗ Hm
~
=
.
 (this just gives back the state equation), 
)(iv  0=)()(lim rt
t
etmt −
∞→
µ  (the transversality condition). 
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The first two conditions are 
 







 ∗+−+
∂
∂
)),((
))),((),(())),((),(()))),((),((())(()())((=
~
1
.
.
21
.
..
ztpe
ztpetpmztpetpmztpetpmtpqtptpq
p
H ς  








+
++
∗+
)),(())),((),(()),(())),((),((
)),(())),((),(())),((),((
)()( 2
1
..
221
..
21
1
..
12
..
11
.
ztpeztpetpmztpeztpetpm
ztpeztpetpmztpetpm
tptµ = 0  [38] 
 
and  
 ))).),((),(((=
~
=
..
ztpetpm
m
Hr ςµµ
∂
∂
−−  [39] 
 
When the market is in equilibrium, 0,=)(
.
tp  and the expression 
p
H
∂
∂
~
 boils down to the 
following:  







 ∗+−+
)),((
))),((),(())),((),(()))),((),((())(()())((
1
.
.
21
.
..
ztpe
ztpetpmztpetpmztpetpmtpqtptpq ς 0,=  
 
,
)),((
))),((),(())),((),(()))),((),(((=))(())(()(
1
.
.
21
.
..







 ∗++
ztpe
ztpetpmztpetpmztpetpmtpqtpqtp ς  
 
,
))((
)),(())),((),((
))((
))),((),(()))),((),(((=11)( .
1
..
2
.
1
.
.








+





+
tpq
ztpeztpetpm
tpq
ztpetpmztpetpm
ticitydemandelas
tp ς  
 
suggesting that the price equals the marginal cost (the right hand side of the above expression is 
the marginal cost in a dynamic setting, which is different from that in a static problem on account 
of the fact that in a dynamic setting the middleman also takes into account the impact of price 
chosen on his purchase price from the producer) when the demand is infinitely elastic. Now 
suppose that as a result of a supply shock, if the middleman wants to hold an extra unit of 
inventory, then the marginal cost of holding an extra unit is higher because the term 
)))),((),(((
.
ztpetpmς  is higher at the previous price at that point in time. The term in 
parentheses in the expression of the marginal cost, i.e. 
))((
)),(())),((),((
))((
))),((),((
.
1
..
2
.
1
.
tpq
ztpeztpetpm
tpq
ztpetpm
+  is a function of price and is the same at 
the previous price. This implies that on the previous price, now the middleman faces  
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





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∂
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..
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..
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1
..
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ztpeztpetpmztpeztpetpm
ztpeztpetpmztpetpm
tptµ  0.<  
 
Therefore in order to satisfy the condition of dynamic optimization, the middleman must 
decrease the price for an increase in inventory. This implies a negative relationship between price 
and inventory. The concept of inventory unifies the market supply and demand. If the supply and 
demand rates are equal, the market is in a steady state equilibrium. If a difference of finite 
magnitude is created between the supply and demand rates and the consumer and the producer 
do not react to a price change induced by a difference in the supply and demand rates, the price 
will continue changing until the system saturates. This behavior can be depicted by the following 
formulation:  
 inventory.market in  changechange Price ∝  
 change. price=P  
 market, in theinventory in  change== smmM −  
 at timeinventory =m t, 
 state.steady in inventory =sm  
 ,=)(==outputInput
dt
dM
dt
mmd
dt
dm s−−  
 ( ) .outputinput=or dtM −∫  
 ( ) or,rate demandratesupply change Price dt−∝ ∫  
 ( ) ,rate demandratesupply = dtKP m −− ∫  
 
where mK  is the proportionality constant. A negative sign indicates that when 
( )rate demandratesupply −  is positive, then P  is negative (i.e. price decreases). The above 
equation can be re-arranged as follows:  
 ( ) or,=rate demandratesupply 
mK
Pdt −−∫  
  
 ( ) ,=0
m
i K
Pdtww −−∫  [40] 
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,ratesupply =iw  
,rate demand=0w  
=mK dimensional constant. 
 
Let at time 0=t , supply rate = demand rate (market is in a steady state equilibrium), then eq. 
(40)  can be written as  
 ( ) 0.=0 dtww sis −∫  [41] 
 
The subscript s  indicates the steady state equilibrium and 0=P  in steady state. Subtracting 
eq. (41)  from eq. (40) , we get:  
 ( ) ( ) or,=00
m
sisi K
Pdtwwdtww −−−− ∫∫  
  
 ( ) ,=0
m
i K
PdtWW −−∫  [42] 
 
rate,supply in  change== where iisi Www − rate. demandin  change== 000 Www s−  
,P  iW  and 0W  are deviation variables, which indicate deviation from the steady state equilibrium. 
The initial values of the deviation variables are zero. Eq. (42)  may also be written as follows:  
 
 ,== MKWdtKP mm −− ∫  [43] 
 
where .= 0WWW i −  If P  gets a jump as a result of some factor other than an inventory change, 
such as imposition of a tax on consumer, that is considered as a separate input and can be added 
to eq. (43)  as follows:  
 .== JMKJWdtKP mm +−+− ∫  [43a] 
 
Similarly, there can be an exogenous shock in inventory other than the price feedback. 
 
Producer 
 
The producer maximizes the present discounted value of the future stream of profits, and his 
present value at time zero is as follows:  
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 ( ) ( )( ) ( )[ ] ,)()()(,)(=(0)
0
dtetIttLtwtLtKFtpV rt−
∞
ℜ−−∫ α  [44] 
 
where α  is the fraction of the market price the producer charges to the middleman. r denotes the 
discount rate. )(tL  (labor) and )(tI  (level of investment) are the control variables and )(tK  the 
state variable. The maximization problem can be written as  
 
{ }
( ) ( )( ) ( )[ ] ,)()()(,)(=(0)
0
)(),(
dtetIttLtwtLtKFtpVMax rt
tItL
−
∞
ℜ−−∫ α  
 
subject to the constraints 
)()(=)(
.
tKtItK δ−  (state equation, describing how the state variable changes with time), 
0=(0) KK  (initial condition), 
0)( ≥tK  (non-negativity constraint on state variable), 
)(∞K  free (terminal condition). 
 
The current-value Hamiltonian for this case is  
  
( ) ( )( ) ( ) [ ].)()()()()()(,)(=~ tKtIttIttLtwtLtKFtpH δµα −+ℜ−−  [45] 
 
Now the maximizing conditions are as follows: 
)(i  )(tL∗  and )(tI ∗  maximize H~  for all t : 0=
~
L
H
∂
∂
 and 0,=
~
I
H
∂
∂
 
)(ii  ,
~
=
.
K
Hr
∂
∂
−− µµ  
)(iii  
µ∂
∂∗ HK
~
=
.
 (this just gives back the state equation), 
)(iv  0=)()(lim rt
t
etKt −
∞→
µ  (the transversality condition). 
 
The first two conditions are as follows:  
( ) ( )( ) 0,=)(,)(=
~ .
2 twtLtKFtpL
H
−
∂
∂ α   [46] 
0,=)()(=
~
tt
I
H µ+−ℜ
∂
∂
  [47] 
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and  
 ( ) ( )( ) .)(,)(=
~
=
.
1
.



 −−
∂
∂
−− ttLtKFtp
K
Hr δµαµµ  [48) 
 
Substituting the value of 
.
µ  and µ  from eq. (47)  into eq. (48)  yields  
 ( ) ( )( ) 0.=)()()(,)(
..
1 ttrtLtKFtp ℜ+ℜ+− δα  
If the price, i.e. )(tp  goes up, (at the previous level of investment and labor) the producer 
faces  
 ( ) ( )( ) 0,>)(,)(
.
2 twtLtKFtp −α  
 ( ) ( )( ) 0.>)()()(,)(
..
1 ttrtLtKFtp ℜ+ℜ+− δα  
 
Therefore, in order to satisfy the condition of dynamic optimization after the price increase, the 
producer must increase the production level. Let p  = market price, c  = a reference price (such 
as the retail price which includes the production cost, profit of producer and profit of the 
middleman). c  is a parameter which may vary with time or be kept fixed for a limited time period, 
e.g. the cost of a product may vary over time or can also remain constant for a while. It is the 
reference point with respect to which the variation in p  is considered by the producer for decision 
making.  
 price,in  change  todue productionin  Change=mW  
where )( cp −  acts as an incentive for the producer to produce more. Therefore,  
 or),( cpWm −∝α  
  
 ).(= cpKW sm −  [49] 
 
When the market is in equilibrium, then 0,=mW  or  
 ).(=0 sss cpK −  [50] 
 
where sK  is the proportionality constant. sp  and sc  are the steady state equilibrium values. 
Subtracting eq. (50)  from eq. (49) , we get:  
 ( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ,=== εsssssm KPCKccppKW −−−−−−  [51] 
 
where CWm ,  and P  are deviation variables. 
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Consumer 
The consumer maximizes the present discounted value of the future stream of utilities, and his 
present value at time zero is as follows:  
 ,))((=(0)
0
dtetxUV tρ−
∞
∫  [52] 
 
where ρ  denotes the discount rate and )(tx  is the control variable. The maximization problem 
can be written as  
 
{ }
,))((=(0)
0
)(
dtetxUVMax t
tx
ρ−
∞
∫  
subject to 
)()()()()(=)(
.
txtptwtatRta −+  (state equation, describing how the state variable changes 
with time). )(ta  is asset holdings (a state variable) and )(tw  and )(tR  are exogenous time 
path of wages and return on assets. 
saa =(0)  (initial condition), 
0)( ≥ta  (non-negativity constraint on state variable), 
)(∞a  free (terminal condition). 
The current-value Hamiltonian for this case is  
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ].)())((=~ txtptwtatRttxUH −++ µ  [53] 
 
The maximizing conditions are as follows: 
)(i  )(tx∗  maximizes H~  for all t : 0,=
~
x
H
∂
∂
 
)(ii  ,
~
=
.
a
H
∂
∂
−− ρµµ  
)(iii  
µ∂
∂∗ Ha
~
=
.
 (this just gives back the state equation), 
)(iv  0=)()(lim t
t
etat ρµ −
∞→
 (the transversality condition). 
The first two conditions are as follows:  
 ( ) 0,=)()()(=
~ .
tpttxU
x
H µ−
∂
∂
 [54] 
 
and  
 ).()(=
~
=
.
tRt
a
H µρµµ −
∂
∂
−−  [55] 
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If the price of good x  goes up, the consumer faces (at the previous level of consumption)  
 ( ) 0.<)()()(=
~ .
tpttxU
x
H µ−
∂
∂
 
Therefore, in order to satisfy the condition of dynamic optimization after the price increase, the 
consumer must decrease the consumption of good x . Let the change in demand be proportional 
to the change in price, i.e. P . Then we can write:  
 
 or,demandin  Change P∝  
  .= PKW dd −  [56] 
 
where dW  is the change in demand due to P ; when P  is positive dW  is negative. 
 
Solution of the model with a quantity tax 
 
From eqs. )(11a , (19)  and (24)  we have the following expressions:  
 ),(=)( tWK
dt
tdP
m−  
 ),(=)( tKtW sm ε−  
 ),()(=)( tPtCt −ε  
 ),(=)( tPKtW dd −  
 
and  
 ),()(=)( tWtWtW dm −  
 
if there is no exogenous change in supply and demand. From the above equations, we obtain  
 [ ])()(=)( tWtWK
dt
tdP
dmm −−  
 [ ])()(= tPKtKK dsm +−− ε  
 [ ].)()()(= tPKKtCKK dssm ++−−  
 
The above expression can be rearranged as follows:  
 
 ).(=)()()( tCKKtPKKK
dt
tdP
smdsm ++  [57] 
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If TtC =)( , i.e. the government imposes a per unit tax on producer at 0=t , then the above 
differential equation becomes as follows:  
 .=)()()( TKKtPKKK
dt
tdP
smdsm ++  [58] 
 
Now let’s look at the dynamics of the price if the quantity tax is imposed on the buyer instead. We 
start from the same expressions as we did for a producer’s tax, i.e.  
 [ ],)()(=)( tWtWK
dt
tdP
dmm −−  
 ),(=)( tKtW sm ε−  
 ).(=)( tPKtW dd −  
 
The market price is the buyer’s price as before, however, the producer will be taking into 
account the price before tax for his/her production decisions. Therefore,  
 ).(=)( tPTt −ε  [59] 
 
This implies that  
 { }[ ],)()(=)( tPKTtPKK
dt
tdP
dsm +−−  
  
 ,=)()()( TKKtPKKK
dt
tdP
smdsm ++  
which is the same as eq. [58]. In order to solve the above differential equation with initial conditions 
of a buyer’s tax, we proceed as follows. 
The characteristic function of the differential equation is 
 0.=)( dsm KKKx ++  
The characteristic function has a single root given by 
 ).(= dsm KKKx +−  
Thus, the complementary solution is  
 
[ ] .=)( )(2
tdKsKmK
c eCtP
+−
 
The particular solution has the form  
 .=)( 1CtPp  
Thus, the solution has the form  
 
[ ] .=)( )(21
tdKsKmKeCCtP +−+  [60] 
 
The constant 1C  is determined by substitution into the differential equation: 
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 [ ] [ ] ,=)()()( )(21
)(
2 TKKeCKKKCKKKeCKKK sm
tdKsKmK
dsmdsm
tdKsKmK
dsm
+−+− +++++−  
  
 .=1
ds
s
KK
TKC
+
 
2C  is determined by the initial condition by  
 ,==(0) 2 TCKK
TKP
ds
s +
+
 
 
ds
s
KK
TKTC
+
−=2  
 
ds
sds
KK
TKTKTK
+
−+=  
 .=
ds
d
KK
TK
+
 
 
Substituting the values of 1C  and 2C  in eq. (60),  we obtain 
 
[ ] .=)( )( tdKsKmK
ds
d
ds
s e
KK
TK
KK
TKtP +−
+
+
+
 [61] 
 
When 0,=t  TP =(0)  (the initial condition), and when ,= ∞t  
ds
s
KK
TKP
+
∞ =)(  (the final 
steady state equilibrium value). In the final equilibrium, the quantity demanded must equal the 
quantity supplied. In order to verify that this holds, we proceed as follows: From eq. [56], the 
change in demand due to a change in price after the tax is as follows:  
 ),(=)( tPKtW dd −  
 ),(=(0))(or tPKwtw didnd −−  
 
where (0)idw  is the initial demand and )(twnd  is the new demand after tax, because )(tWd  
is a deviation variable, i.e. deviation from the initial equilibrium value. Similarly from eq. [51], for 
the supply  
 ),(=)( tKtW sm ε−  
 [ ].)(=(0))( tPTKwtw simnm −−−  
 
In the final equilibrium  
 or),(=)( ∞∞ ndnm ww  
 [ ] ),((0)=)((0) ∞−∞−− PKwPTKw didsim  
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which holds as in the initial equilibrium, the quantity demanded equals the quantity supplied, 
i.e.  
 (0).=(0) idim ww  
 
An optimal quantity tax path 
 
The efficiency loss as a result of a tax, generally mentioned in the economics literature is the dead 
weight loss as a result of comparisons of the pre and post tax market equilibriums. However, the 
dynamic picture shows that there is some efficiency loss on the dynamic adjustment path to the 
new equilibrium as well after the tax. After the imposition of the tax, the price jumps to a price 
equal to the previous equilibrium price plus the tax. The price then adjusts over time to bring the 
new equilibrium price which is higher than the previous equilibrium price and less than the price 
at the time the tax was imposed depending on the elasticity of demand and supply schedules. A 
pile up of inventory indicates a higher supply than demand, and a depletion of inventory occurs 
when demand is higher than the supply in a given time period. When the demand and supply are 
the same, there is no efficiency loss. If the demand and supply are different, the output and/ or 
consumption is being lost at that point in time. Therefore if we sum up the inventory change at all 
points in time, we get the total efficiency loss, which is as follows:  
 .)(=
0
dttMEL ∫
∞
 [62] 
 
From eq. [43a], we have  
 .)(=)( JtMKtP m +−  
The value of J  can be found by imposing the initial conditions, i.e. TP =(0) , and 
TKM d=(0)  (the decrease in demand because of tax at 0=t  from eq. (56)),  therefore 
.= TKKTJ dm+  Substituting the value of J  in eq. ),(43a  we get  
 ,)(=)( TKKTtMKtP dmm ++−  
and eq. [62] can be written as  
 [ ] .)(1=
0
dtTKKTtP
K
EL dm
m
−−− ∫
∞
 [62.a] 
 
In Figure 3, the inventory difference jumps to TKd , i.e. the decrease in demand because of 
tax at 0=t . The demand does not equal the supply any longer, and the market forces come into 
play. The inventory along with the price adjusts over time and arrives at the new equilibrium, i.e. 
).(∞M  The shaded area is the efficiency loss (the amount of output and/ or consumption lost) 
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during the adjustment process. The area between the lines 0,=)(tM  and )(=)( ∞MtM  is the 
efficiency loss resulting from a difference in pre and post tax market equilibriums. From eq. [56], 
the change in demand due to a change in price after the tax is as follows:  
 ),(=)( tPKtW dd −  
 ),(=(0))(or tPKwtw didnd −−  
 
where (0)idw  is the initial demand and )(twnd  is the new demand after tax, because )(tWd  is 
a deviation variable, i.e. deviation from the initial equilibrium value. Therefore the expression for 
the tax revenue is as follows:  
 [ ].)((0)= tPKwTTR did −  [63] 
 
If we want to minimize the efficiency loss subject to the constraint that tax revenue generated 
is greater than or equal to G  in a given time period, our problem is as follows:  
 .s.t.min GTREL
T
≥  
The choice variable is the tax rate, and the constraint is binding. The Lagrangian for the above 
problem is as follows:  
 [ ] [ ][ ])((0))(1=
0
tPKwTGdtTKKTtP
K diddmm
−−+−−− ∫
∞
λL  
 
[ ] dtTK
K
Te
KKK
TK
KKK
TK
d
m
tdKsKmK
dsm
d
dsm
s






++
+
−
+
− +−∞
∫
)(
0 )()(
=  
 
[ ] .(0) )(




















+
+
+
−−+ +− tdKsKmK
ds
d
ds
s
did eKK
TK
KK
TKKwTGλ  
 
Taking the first order condition with respect to T , we get:  
 
[ ] dtK
K
e
KKK
K
KKK
K
d
m
tdKsKmK
dsm
d
dsm
s






++
+
−
+
− +−∞
∫
1
)()(
)(
0
 
 
[ ]












+
+
+
−− +− tdKsKmK
ds
d
ds
s
did eKK
K
KK
KTKw )((0)λ  
 
 
 
[ ] 0.=)( 





+
+
+
+ +− tdKsKmK
ds
d
ds
s
d eKK
K
KK
KTKλ  
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This implies 
 
[ ] dte
KKK
K
KKK
K
K
K tdKsKmK
dsm
d
dsm
s
m
d 





+
−
+
−+ +−
∞
∫
)(
0 )()(
1
 
 
[ ]






+
+
+
+ +− tdKsKmK
ds
d
ds
s
d eKK
K
KK
KTK )(2λ  
 
 
 (0),= idwλ  
or  
 
[ ]
[ ]
.
2
)()(
1(0)
=
)(
)(
0






+
+
+






+
−
+
−+−
+−
+−
∞
∫
tdKsKmK
ds
d
ds
s
d
tdKsKmK
dsm
d
dsm
s
m
did
e
KK
K
KK
KK
dte
KKK
K
KKK
K
K
Kw
T
λ
λ
 [64] 
 
Taking the first order condition with respect to λ , we get:  
 
[ ] 0.=(0) )( 











+
+
+
−− +− tdKsKmK
ds
d
ds
s
did eKK
TK
KK
TKKwTG  [65] 
 
Substituting the value of T  from eq. [64] into [65], 
 
[ ]
[ ]






+
+
+






+
−
+
−+−
+−
+−
∞
∫
tdKsKmK
ds
d
ds
s
d
tdKsKmK
dsm
d
dsm
s
m
did
id
e
KK
K
KK
KK
dte
KKK
K
KKK
K
K
Kw
wG
)(
)(
0
2
)()(
1(0)
(0).=
λ
λ
 
 
[ ]






+
+
+
− +− tdKsKmK
ds
d
ds
s
d eKK
K
KK
KK )(  
 
[ ]
[ ]
,
2
)()(
1(0)
2
)(
)(
0




















+
+
+






+
−
+
−+−
∗
+−
+−
∞
∫
tdKsKmK
ds
d
ds
s
d
tdKsKmK
dsm
d
dsm
s
m
did
e
KK
K
KK
KK
dte
KKK
K
KKK
K
K
Kw
λ
λ
 
 ,(0)2(0)(0)2(0)2=4or 222222 JwJwJwwQG idididid λλλλλ +−−−  
 
[ ] ,=where )(






+
+
+
+− tdKsKmK
ds
d
ds
s
d eKK
K
KK
KKQ  
225 
N. Nawaz / European Journal of Government and Economics 6(2), 191-225 
 
 
[ ] .
)()(
1= )(
0
dte
KKK
K
KKK
K
K
KJ tdKsKmK
dsm
d
dsm
s
m
d 





+
−
+
−+ +−
∞
∫  
 
This implies that  
 { } 0.=4(0) 222 JQGwid −− λ  
  
 .
4(0)
=
2 QGw
J
id −
λ  
Eq. [64] can also be written as  
 .
2
(0)=
Q
JwT id
λ
λ −
 [66] 
 
Substituting the value of λ  into eq. [66], we get:  
 ,
4(0)
2
4(0)
(0)
=)(
2
2
QGw
QJ
J
QGw
Jw
tT
id
id
id
−
−
−
 
 .
2
4(0)(0)
=)(
2
Q
QGww
tT idid
−−
 [67] 
 
A negative optimal tax is an optimal subsidy. In order to check the second order condition for 
minimization, we proceed as follows: The Lagrangian can be written as  
 ( )[ ].(0)= QTwTGJT id −−+ λL  
The Bordered Hessian matrix of the Lagrange function is as follows:  
 ,
4(0)
22(0)
2(0)0
=
2










−
−
−
QGw
QJQTw
QTw
BH
id
id
id
 
the determinant of which is negative as ( ) 0,<2(0) 2QTwid −−  which implies that the efficiency 
loss is minimized. 
